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March 12, 1999The Value of a Fresh Start: Earnings Persistence and the Migration of Single Mothers
ABSTRACT
This paper considers the possibility that migration provides individuals with a “fresh start.”  In other
words, I consider a model where the temporary component of earnings is correlated over time and
migration causes this correlation to change.  Results for single mothers suggest that migration causes the
correlation of the temporary components to decline significantly.  Furthermore, if one does not control
this effect of migration one finds that single mothers decrease their earnings and income by migrating.
However, if one considers migration as a fresh start then, on average, a single mother migrants increase
their expected earnings and income ten percent by moving. JEL(J61)1
The Value of a Fresh Start: Earnings Persistence and the Migration of Single Mothers
I. Introduction
Economists generally consider migration to be a human capital investment.  Individuals increase
their earnings by migrating, but will only make the investment if the benefits exceed the costs.  Another
popular view of migration is that it is a means to provide an individual with a “fresh start.”  This
romantic vision of migration suggests that people who are dissatisfied with their current life can solve
some of their problems by moving to a new area. The goals of this paper are to determine whether there
is any evidence of a fresh start with respect to earnings and ascertain how estimates of the effects of
migration change when one accounts for the possibility of the fresh start.
If migration provides individuals with a fresh start with respect to earnings then one would
expect individuals who have faced recent declines in earnings to move.  This is consistent with the
finding in the human capital literature that shows individuals invest in human capital when their
opportunity costs are low. For instance, Ashenfelter (1978) shows that the mean earnings of participants
in government training programs decline in the year prior to program entry.  Mincer (1978) shows that
the migration rates are higher for the unemployed.
However, typical models of migration do not account for the possibility that the earnings decline
would persist if they did not migrate.  In other words, there is something intrinsic about moving to a new
location that changes outcomes.  For instance, an individual’s social networks may be such that this
person associates with individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol. This might lower one’s own productivity. 
Migrating and leaving this social network might improve the individual’s productivity.  I model the
intrinsic change in outcomes by suggesting that there is an unobserved temporary component of earnings
that is persistent over time.  Migration causes the persistence to decline.  Ignoring this change in
persistence might understate the true effect of migration on earnings.2 Rischall (1998) estimates these simple models for males and found that migration increases earnings.
2
For this paper I analyze single mothers. Typical analysis of the effects of migration focuses on
men.  Mincer (1978) finds that male heads of household increase earnings by migrating.  However, I
show that the estimates from simple models suggest migration decreases earnings of single mothers.
2  I
use my analysis to show that the effects of migration on earnings are positive for single mothers once one
accounts for the possibility of the fresh start.  The fact that there is a change in sign when considering the
two approaches implies that examining single mothers stresses the importance of considering migration
as a fresh start. 
When considering single mother migration the literature typically examines the welfare magnet
hypothesis to see whether these women move to higher benefit regions.  Moffitt (1992) reviews the
welfare magnet literature and shows that the more recent studies have found a high correlation between
state benefit levels and migration. Most of this literature examines moves across highly aggregated
regions.  Included in this review is Blank (1988) which finds that the typical low-income female-headed
household is more likely to move from a low-wage, low-benefit region than from a high-wage, high
benefit region.  Although single mothers move to higher benefit regions, they are also moving to higher
wage regions.  Furthermore, Walker (1994) finds no evidence supporting the welfare magnet hypothesis
when analyzing migration across contiguous counties.  Thus, there is evidence of single mothers
migrating for benefits. However, there is also evidence that single mothers move for other reasons such
as wages.  With this paper I show that there significant group of single mothers who improve earnings by
migrating.
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section II describes the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) data set used for the empirical analysis, and compares individual outcomes
conditional on migrating to those conditional on staying using exogenous selection and fixed-effects3
assumptions.  These identifying assumptions indicate that migration causes single mothers to have lower
earnings and income, and makes them more likely to receive welfare.  However, these traditional
assumptions do not account for persistent negative earnings shocks.  The data reveal that the earnings of
migrants decline sharply relative to the wages of stayers in the years before they migrate.  Section III
presents an earnings equation with correlated error terms over time, where the correlation changes if an
individual moves.  Section III also provides the empirical methodology used to estimate the parameters
of the earnings equation.  Specifically, the Estimation/Classification (EC)-algorithm is used to classify
individuals into different types to account for selection into migration, and to estimate the parameters for
each of these types.  This estimator can account for unobserved individual heterogeneity which is
important when considering migration.  It can also allow for error terms to be correlated across
observations. Section IV presents the estimates of the parameters of the model of Section III.  The results
from these estimates indicate that there is a significant decline in the persistence of temporary
component of earnings if an individual migrates. Furthermore, estimating the effects of migration using
traditional identification assumptions understates the returns to migration.  The EC-algorithm divides the
single mothers into two types which I label wage earners and benefit receivers.  On average, the wage
earner migrants increase their expected earnings and income ten percent by migrating.  Furthermore, the
migration behavior of these women is not sensitive to an overall change in benefit level.  Of the women
who primarily receive benefits, most change their earnings and income outcomes little by migrating. 
However, a small portion increase income by moving to states with much higher benefit levels than their
initial location.  Section V provides concluding remarks.  
II. Data
The data for this paper come from the geo-coded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) for the years 1979-1992.  Since I am interested in the outcomes of those who are eligible to3  Rischall (1998) provides the same analysis for a male subsample of the NLSY.
4  For example,  I might observe one particular woman for twelve years.  The first five years this woman is
neither married nor has children. In the next four years she has children, but is not married.  The last three years she
is married.  By my selection criteria this woman is observed four times in my sample.  Once a woman is married
she can no longer come back into my sample.
4
receive benefits, I have restricted my sample to single mothers. This is the group most likely to receive
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
3   The subsample consists of mothers who have never
been married.
4  I have omitted 1,593 observations where respondents receive neither earnings nor AFDC
benefits in either the current year or the previous year, because I want to restrict my sample to those that
need income from earnings or benefits.     
Furthermore, I have partitioned the NLSY panel into annual cross-sections from 1980 to 1991. 
These separate cross-sections are pooled into one large data set. This leaves me with a sample of 829
single mothers who have never been married whom I observe a total of 4,213 times. Variable definitions
are contained in Table 1.  Summary statistics of the resulting data set are contained in Table 2.  Three
variable descriptions regarding migration and three variable descriptions regarding income and earnings
deserve special attention. 
Move is defined as a migration across counties, unless that migration is within the same
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).  This restriction is intended to exclude moves within the
same labor market.  Also, tracking migration at the county level allows a comparison of moves across
states with moves within states.  In the latter case, the benefit level is unchanged.  If an individual is in
one county in year t-1 and another county in year t then the Move equals one for that individual in year t. 
If the individual stays in the same county in year t+1 as she was in year t then Move equals zero for that
individual in year t+1.  Ever Move is a variable that indicates whether a person has ever moved since
becoming a single mother.  If a person has never changed counties it takes on the value zero.  If the
person lives in her county of origin in year t-1 and another county in year t then Ever Move takes on the5 I examined the amount of benefits individuals claim to receive in the NLSY and I found this variable to
be extremely error-laden. I believe that this measure of income is a better approximation than earnings plus claimed
benefits.
6 If a person lives in one county in year t-1 and another county in year t then the respondent has been
characterized as a mover in year t.  If the respondent has not changed counties then she is characterized as a stayer
in year t. The summary statistics in Table 3 contain the individual’s year t characteristics. In other words, these are
the characteristics before a move-stay decision. 
5
value one in year t and in all subsequent years.  Years Since First Move takes on the value zero if Ever
Move equals zero.  It increases by one for every year after the first move. It is unobserved in instances
where the first move took place before the first survey year.
Earnings is the earnings a respondent received during the month of the interview.  I use earnings
rather than wages, because they are comparable to a state’s maximum AFDC benefit level which is
measured on a monthly basis.  I use only the one month of earnings because I do not know exactly when
during the a year a move takes place.  Using only the one month ensures that I do not mix the earnings in
two locations.  Welfare benefits are measured by Maximum Benefit Level.  This is the maximum
amount of AFDC benefits an individual can receive and is a function of the number of children and state
of residence.  It should be noted that this measure of benefits only considers AFDC and ignores other
benefits such as public housing, housing subsidies, Medicaid and Food Stamps.  In addition to earnings
and welfare benefits, I construct a measure of income.  Income is defined as the maximum of the
Earnings variable and the Maximum Benefit Level variable.  This variable is a measure of income in
the sense that if an individuals earnings are low than they can be supplemented by AFDC.  The most
AFDC that can be received is the Maximum Benefit Level.  For simplicity, I assume income is bounded
below by Maximum Benefit Level.
5  
Table 3 compares the characteristics of movers before a move to stayers.
6  There are many
differences between movers and stayers.  Among the black subsample, as standard human capital theory
predicts, movers tend to be younger, more educated and have fewer children than stayers.    However, the6
black movers have lower earnings than their staying counterparts.  Furthermore, the black migrants have
lower income. In the white subsample, movers and stayers are similar in terms of age and education. 
However, movers tend to have fewer children and are less likely to receive benefits.   The major
difference between the black and white subsamples is that movers have higher earnings than stayers in
the white subsample.  Also, white movers come from lower benefit states than white stayers, whereas
black movers and stayers come from states with relatively similar benefit levels.  
From Table 3, we see that the individuals who migrate are, as human capital theory predicts, the
most able.  The question now becomes how migration improves these individual’s outcomes.  Table 4
describes the association between migration and the outcomes -- earnings and income -- under two
different specifications.  The first specification, random-effects, does not control for an individual fixed-
effect, whereas the second specification does.  The coefficient on the Move variable in this specification
can only be considered the effect of migration under an exogenous selection assumption.  In other words,
this assumption implies that there is nothing unobservably different between movers and stayers. 
However, if this not the case the random-effects estimates will give an inconsistent measure of the effect
of migration. From random-effects specifications earnings decrease 13 percent after migration and
income decreases ten percent after migration.  However, when controlling for the individual fixed-effect,
income and earnings decrease substantially more after the move.  Furthermore, these outcomes do not
improve much after the initial move.  This is evidenced by the small coefficient estimates on the Years
Since First Move Variable.
If one assumes exogenous selection, one could interpret the random effects coefficient estimates
of Ever Move and Years Since First Move as the estimated effect of migration on outcomes. 
Alternatively, if one assumed that each individual’s outcome differs by a fixed-effect that is constant
over time and that is correlated with the decision to migrate, then one could interpret the fixed-effect
coefficient estimates as the effect of migration on outcomes.  If one interprets these coefficients in the7
fixed-effects model as the effect of migration, then migration causes these individuals to have lower
incomes, and random effects estimates understate this effect.  Furthermore, using a Hausman test one
rejects the use of the random-effects model.  
Thus Table 4 suggests that migration causes a significant decline in earnings and in income for
single mothers. However, Rischall (1998) estimated fixed and random-effects models for male earnings
and found that the effect of migration was, on average, a one percent increase in earnings for every year
after the move.
Table 5 presents the effects of migration on the probability of receiving benefits under
exogenous selection and fixed-effects assumptions.  The exogenous selection results imply that the
probability of receiving benefits increases right after a move, but then declines. Controlling for the fixed-
effect implies that migration causes increased benefit receipt and that the probability of receiving
benefits is increasing in time after the move.
Overall, the results from Tables 4 and 5 are a puzzle, suggesting that neither the exogenous
selection assumption nor the fixed-effect assumption are appropriate ways to model the behavior of the
single mother population.  First, the large differences in the random-effects and fixed-effects results
imply that there is selection into migration, and thus controlling for a fixed-effect is appropriate. 
Furthermore, the fixed-effects results suggest that these women make themselves worse off by migrating. 
They do not appear to be improving themselves in earnings, income or benefit receipt.  However, males
make large gains in earnings by migrating.  So either there is something wrong with these models of
migration or single mothers do not consider income an important factor in the migration decision.
A possible explanation for these results is that the exogenous selection and fixed-effect
assumptions do not account for any of the relative changes in wages of movers to stayers before the
move.  Table 3 showed that black movers had much lower earnings than black stayers, despite having
formed more human capital.  Table 6 compares the earnings that working movers and stayers receive8
before a move-stay decision controlling for age, education, number of children, state unemployment
level, AFQT score, a regional dummy variable and a series of time dummies.  The difference between
earnings among movers and stayers increases in the years before the move-stay decision.  Single mother
movers earn five percent more than similar stayers two years before the move, but they earn 13 percent
less a year before the move.  Furthermore, the decline is not being caused by the timing of the move. 
The earnings measure I use is the earnings at the time of the interview in the current location.  Therefore,
the measure is not picking up the potentially low earnings in the new location.  Thus, the table indicates
that among single mothers there are large negative changes in the earnings paths of movers relative to
stayers in the years before the move-stay decision.   
Female migrants experience sharp declines in earnings relative to the stayers.  These lower
earnings could be an impetus for migration. Another way to phrase the problem is that lagged earnings
are an omitted variable in the estimating equation.  Lagged earnings are negatively correlated with the
migration indicator.  Both the migration indicator and lagged earnings are positively correlated with
current earnings.  This implies that the omission of lagged earnings in the estimating equation biases
downward the estimated effects of migration.  The following section considers a empirical model in
which changes in earnings are a motivating factor for individuals to migrate.  
III. Emprical Model
In the basic neo-classical model of migration an individual compares the discounted value of
income gains with the cost of migration for a set of potential locations and moves to the location for
which the net gains are highest.  Building on this view of migration, McCall and McCall (1987) and
Pessino (1991) have proposed Multi-Armed Bandit models of migration that also view migration as a
learning process.  Individuals do not have perfect information and the only way they can learn more
about their wage prospects in a new location is to move to that location.  Similarly, Kennan and Walker9
(1997) view migration in these imperfect information terms.  In Kennan and Walker’s model an
individual not only learns about prospects in the new location, but also gains some information on
prospects in other locations.  Furthermore, they  assume welfare benefits provide a minimum income
level, so that benefits provide a safety net for migrants.
The approach that this paper takes is that after controlling for individual-specific human capital,
current earnings depend on last period’s earnings if the individual stays in the same location. However, if
the individual moves the dependence in past earnings decreases.  This is similar to the Multi-Armed
Bandit approach in that one obtains more information about what will happen next period in the current
location, than about other locations.
From the data, we see that in the years prior to the move, the earnings of individuals who migrate
change relative to the individuals who stay.  In particular, the earnings of single mother movers decline
sharply relative to single mother stayers.  The declining relative earnings could be a motivating factor for
migration.  The model considers migration as an activity that changes an individual’s labor market
opportunities.  An individual’s earnings are positively correlated with her prior earnings.  An individual
with low earnings is likely to continue to have low earnings if she remains in her current location. 
However, if she migrates, the dependence in past earnings declines. 
The underlying intuition for the model I propose is that migration partially restarts the earnings
process.  If an individual stays in the same location, temporary shocks to earnings are persistent. 
Examples of such shocks could be employer misconceptions of true marginal product of the worker or
the ability of social networks in providing good advice in job search.  Also, migration forces an
individual to use different social networks.  Furthermore, if employers form networks within labor
markets, and it is costly for the networking to occur across markets, then employer misconceptions will
not follow the worker.
  I assume the earnings process takes on the following form:7  For ease of notation, from this point onward I will suppress the location specific function arguments.
8  The covariates I use are Age, Education, Children, AFQT, White, South, Unemployment and a





lt is the location of the individual in period t.  If lt = lt-1 the individual stayed in the same location.
Otherwise, the individual migrated. wt( lt)  is the earnings at time t at location lt.
7  Xt  is a vector of
individual and location covariates at time t at location lt.
8  The "i term is unobserved, individual-specific
and time and location-invariant. It is correlated with the decision to migrate and some components of X. 
The  ,t terms are temporary components of earnings.
If  lt = lt-1 then
If  lt ￿ lt-1  then
 The ,t terms are unobserved and normally distributed with mean zero and variance F
2/(1-D
2) and are
uncorrelated with Xt.  The <t terms are unobserved, independent and distributed normally with mean zero
and variance F




2). The <t and the .t terms are independent of each other.  Equation (2) implies that
the temporary component follows an AR(1) process if the individual stays in the same location. 
Equation (3) also implies that the temporary component follows an AR(1) process if the individual11
ln(wit)'*)Xit%"i%(1&Mit)D,it&1%(1&Mit)<it%MitJ,it&1%Mit.it. (4)
moves.  However,   if  J is less than D then the correlation decreases after a move.
Equations (1)-(3) can be interpreted as follows.  If the individual does not change locations from
the previous period her earnings are a function of individual and location specific variables and the
previous period’s temporary component.  If the individual decides to migrate, the dependence of current
earnings on past earnings decreases.  In other words, the individual is allowed to partially restart her
earnings process by migrating.  Furthermore, migration is a risky venture.  The variance of earnings
conditional on current information is lower in the current location than in other areas.  Specifically, the
variance of earnings conditional on past information in the current location is F
2.  The variance of
earnings in a different location is (1-J
2)F
2/(1-D
2).  The variances are constrained to ensure the stationarity
of the earnings process.  One interpretation of this constraint is that each individual receives shocks in
each period and in each location.  However, the individual only fully observes the shock of the current
location.  Since the individual only observes part of the shocks in the other locations and these shocks
accumulate each period, the variance of  earnings conditional on past information in a new location is
greater than that variance in the current location.   If this is the case then the variance of earnings
conditional on past information increases by a factor of (1-J
2)/(1-D
2).
I formalize the empirical model below.  The earnings equation can be rewritten:
  Let Mt =1 if lt ￿ lt-1 and 0 otherwise.  Move is my measure of Mt in the data. By estimating ", *,
J and D, one can forecast the earnings that movers would have received had they never moved.  One
problem with estimating the parameters of Equation (4) is that earnings are censored for those people
who do not work.  This a large problem when considering the single mother population.  In order to
combat this problem, I assume that the unobserved term,  ,, is distributed normally with mean zero.  I
also assume that if an individual receives benefits, her true earnings are censored below the maximum9  This alternative also allows coefficients besides the constant to differ across types.  Specifically, I allow
the variance parameter, F, to differ across types.
10 See Dempster et al. (1977) for more on the EM-Algorithm.
11  Properties of the estimator are discussed in El-Gamal and Grether (1996, 1997).  The EC-estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal as the number of time periods and the number of individuals goes to infinity.
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amount of benefit levels she can receive.  These assumptions allow me to estimate Equation (4) using a
Tobit specification. 
Ideally, I would like to estimate this model as a fixed-effects model with censoring.  However,
the fact that earnings are censored implies that one cannot difference equations as in a standard fixed-
effects model.  Honoré (1992) discusses the approach to estimating  a fixed-effects Tobit with lagged
dependent variables.  His methods require that the error terms are independent and identically
distributed, but an assumption of my model is that the error terms are correlated.  Thus, Honoré’s
methodology cannot be used.  Also, with a fixed-effects model one cannot observe the effects of
variables that are constant over the sample period, such as race or AFQT score.
An alternative to assuming that each individual has a separate individual-specific unobserved
term, ", is to assume that there are only finitely many individual-specific terms.
9  In other words, a fixed-
effects model typically assumes that each individual has their own fixed-effects.  In a sample of n
individuals, one would like to identify n fixed-effects.  An alternative to assuming that each individual
has her own fixed-effect is to assume that there are k < n fixed effects.  Each individual will fall into one
of these k types.  The goal is to identify the k different " terms, and to find the probability that each
individual falls into each type.  A common way to estimate such a model is the Expectation
Maximization (EM)-algorithm.
10  However, it is computationally slow and cumbersome.  Instead I use
the Estimation/Classification (EC) estimator developed by El-Gamal and Grether (1995).
11  A detailed
description of the algorithm is contained in Appendix A.  This method is computationally quicker, and12  As a comparison I estimated my model on a subsample of 82 males who I observe a total of 470 times
using both methods.  There are no qualitative differences between the two sets of estimates, yet it took 24 times
longer to obtain the estimates from the EM-algorithm. Estimates from this comparison are available upon request.
13  Notable exceptions are the coefficients on White.  However, these results are consistent with Neal and
Johnson (1996).  They find that controlling for AFQT reduces the coefficient on race variables. 
13
provides results similar to EM-algorithm estimates.
12  
The major difference between the two algorithms is that the EM-algorithm classifications of
individuals are treated as nuisance parameters.  The EC-algorithm identifies each individual’s
classification.  In other words, the EM-algorithm identifies the probability each individual belongs to
each type, whereas the EC-algorithm assumes that the probability an individual belongs to a type is
either zero or one.  Possible misclassifications may bias the EC-algorithm estimates, but as the number
of observations on each individual goes to infinity the bias from misclassifications disappears.  Thus, the
EC-algorithm performs well for large T, where T is the number of times one observes each individual. 
In Monte Carlo studies, El-Gamal and Grether (1997) finds that the estimator performs reasonably for a
T as small as three. On average, I observe each single mother 5.08 times.
One final consideration is the choice of the number of types.  In general increasing the number of
types increases the log-likelihood.  For my sample I subtract a penalty function that increases in the
number of types and I choose the number of types that maximizes the log-likelihood minus the penalty
function.  The description of the penalty function used appears in Appendix A. 
IV. Results
Table 7 contains the results obtained by estimating the parameters of the earnings equations with
the EC-algorithm.   All estimates have the expected sign and most are statistically significant at the five
percent level.
13  Also, the estimate of D is large, 0.44.  This implies a large correlation in the temporary
component of earnings among people who stay in the same location. The estimate of J, 0.27, is also quite14
large. However, one can reject D = J.  This implies that although migration does not completely start over
the earnings process, it causes a substantial decrease in the correlation in earnings over time.  
The EC-algorithm classifies single mothers into two separate types.  Among the two types there
is very little difference in race or the tendency to migrate.  However, Type 1 single mothers are less
likely to receive benefits.  The Type 2 single mothers receive benefits in 86 percent of the observations,
whereas Type 1 single mothers receive benefits in only 19 percent of the observations.  The other major
differences between the two types are in education and AFQT score.  Type 1 single mothers obtain one
extra year of education, on average.  The Type 1 single mothers obtain AFQT scores that average 0.21
standard deviations above the overall mean, whereas Type 2 single mothers have scores that average 0.18
standard deviations below the overall mean.
As mentioned previously a possible problem with the EC-algorithm is that it may misclassify
individuals’ types.  These misclassifications will bias the estimates.  To measure the degree to which
misclassifications are a problem, I calculate the Average Normalized Entropy (ANE).  This is the
summary statistic that El-Gamal and Grether (1997) use to measure the problem.  Appendix A describes
the ANE statistic. Essentially the ANE is an aggregate measure of the dispersion of beliefs on the
posterior probability that an individual falls into each type.  If there is large dispersion then the EC-
algorithm is a close approximation to the EM-algorithm.  In other words, the EC-alogrithm will be a
close approximation if I have strong posterior beliefs that I have correctly classified the individuals. The
ANE measure lies between zero and one.  An ANE close to zero implies that there are few
misclassifications.  The ANE is not high for the single mother subsample.  The value of  0.293 implies
that, on average,  my posterior belief is that I have correctly classified individuals  94% of the time. 
Thus, the EC-algorithm estimates are a reliable approximation to the EM-algorithm estimates. 
Using the results from Table 7, one can obtain estimates of the effects of migration on wages and14  The prediction of the probability of benefit receipt is the predicted probability of being censored.  The
prediction of income is based on the following assumption: income equals earnings if earnings is greater than the
maximum benefit level. Income is equal to the maximum benefit levels otherwise.
15  Again, these estimated effects are keeping unemployment rate and region constant.
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welfare benefit receipt for those who migrate.
14  According to the model, migration partially restarts the
earnings process.  This means the effect of migration on earnings differs across individuals.  In
particular, those with high earnings in their original location will not receive any monetary benefit from
migrating.
When considering the effects of migration for the single mother subpopulation one needs to
consider welfare benefits as well as earnings.  Table 8 presents the effects of migration for a Type 1, 22
year-old, black female single mother with one child, eleven years of education in a non-southern state
with a seven percent unemployment rate for different sets of residuals, log benefit levels of original
location and log benefit levels of the destination.
15  If the individual has a lagged temporary component
equal to -0.2 then she can increase earnings 3.5 percent by migrating.  Likewise, if the lagged temporary
component were 0.2 then her earnings decrease by 3.5 percent.  Notice that even when the individual
migrates to a state with the same benefit levels and is increasing expected earnings by migrating, it is
possible to increase the probability of receiving benefit levels.  This is because of the risk involved with
migrating.  The variance of the earnings process conditional on past information increases when an
individual migrates.  Also, the expected income can increase for this same reason.  In all of the cases
where there are no expected earnings gains from migrating, the individual increases the probability of
benefit receipt and increases expected income.
Table 8 describes which groups should be made better off with respect to earnings by migrating.
Table 9 checks to see if the people in these groups are the ones migrating.  Type 1 single mothers are
predominantly wage earners, and the ones who move have the tendency to improve their earnings by16
migrating.  On average, they increase earnings and income ten percent by migrating.  Also, the ones who
move to a new state have a tendency to go to a higher benefit state.  However, for the most part they are
not using the benefits.  
The model predicts most stayers would increase their earnings and income had they moved, but
these increases are not as much as the increases experienced by those who actually move.  It is not
surprising that everyone who would increase their earnings by migrating does not move.  Migration is
costly.  Also, we see some individuals migrate that the model predicts are worse off (monetary-wise). 
This implies that there are reasons to move besides money.  However, modeling the earnings process in a
manner that controls for migration reducing the persistence in negative earnings shocks shows that
money is a more important factor in migration than simple fixed-effects models would indicate.    
Contrary to Type 1s, Type 2 single mothers use benefits when they move, but they would have
used benefits had they stayed in their original location.  They improve their earnings, but this does not
matter.  Their earnings are still below the benefit levels of their state of residence.  These women also
have a tendency to move to higher benefit states.  Type 2 single mothers go to states with eleven percent
higher benefits than their original states.  This is opposed to the five percent increase that Type 1 single
mothers experience.  However, among the moves these women make, most of them are within state
borders.  The moves within state borders cannot be for the purpose of increasing benefits.  Also, only
slightly more than half of the Type 2 single mothers who move out of state go to higher benefit states. 
Nevertheless, the ones who do go to higher benefit states are going to states with substantially higher
benefits.  This implies that there are moves among the single mother population that merely result in the
women receiving increased benefit levels.  However, most moves among the Type 2 single mothers do
not change earnings and income outcomes much.
From these results one sees that some single mothers increase the welfare benefits they receive
by migrating.  Others increase earnings substantially by migrating.  However, the single mothers who do16  Other explanatory variables are Age, Education, Children, Unemployment, AFQT, South, White
and a series of time dummies. 1812 observations are used in estimation.  A full set of results are available upon
request.
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increase their earnings by migrating might be using welfare benefits as a safety net.  Although these
women predominantly earn wages, there are periods where they are observed receiving benefits. 
Declining benefit levels increase the riskiness of migration and may prevent these women from partaking
in this valuable human capital investment.  In order to examine the sensitivity of migration behavior
among wage earning single mothers, I analyze Type 1 single mothers who stay in the same state.  In
particular, wage earning single mothers from low benefit states should be less likely to move within their
home state than similar wage earning single mothers from high benefit states.  For this analysis, I regress
the migration indicator variable on the natural log of state benefit levels using a probit specification.
16 
The parameter estimate of the coefficient on the natural log of state benefit levels is 0.008.  This estimate
has a standard error equal to 0.21.  The estimate is not statistically significant at a five percent level and
it is small. The results imply that a wage earning single mother is 0.009 percentage points more likely to
move within a state with average benefit levels than a similar single mother in a state with 25 percent
less benefit levels.  Thus, it appears that a wage earning single mother’s migration behavior is not
sensitive to overall changes in state benefit levels.        
Overall, the results from this section imply that models which do not account for migration
partially restarting the earnings process understate the effects of migration on earnings and income.  
Also, most single mothers increase their earnings by migration.  The increase is substantial for single
mothers who are primarily wage earners, but is negligible for single mothers who primarily receive
AFDC benefits.   Furthermore, the migration behavior of wage earning single mothers does not appear to
be sensitive to overall changes in benefit levels.  In other words, if all states reduced their benefit levels
there would be little change in the migration behavior of the wage earning migrants.  However, it is also18
clear that a small proportion of the single mothers are moving to higher benefit states and increase the
amount of benefits they receive by migrating.   
V. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to determine whether there is any evidence for the notion that
migration provides individuals with a "fresh start." Examining single mothers, results suggest that
migration gives people the opportunity for a new beginning with respect to earnings.  Migration causes
the correlation between past and current earnings shocks to decline significantly. Furthermore, if one
does not consider the possibility of a fresh start one understates the effect of migration.
The results from fixed-effects models that do not account for the possibility of a fresh start imply
single mothers make themselves worse off by migrating with respect to earnings and overall income. 
Results imply migration decreases single mother earnings 40 percent and overall income 21 percent.
Results also suggest that the earnings of migrants decline relative to non-migrants in the years before a
move.  Thus, it is the individuals who have faced negative earnings shocks who are most likely to move. 
If earnings shocks are persistent and migration provides people with a fresh start, it is the individuals
with negative earnings shocks who will benefit the most from migration.
Once I take into account persistence in the earnings process and the possibility that the
persistence can change with migration, I find that correlation in earnings shocks declines from 0.44 to
0.27 if a person migrates.  Furthermore, there is a group of single mother migrants who increase their
incomes and earnings an average of 10 percent by moving.  There is another group of single mothers that
receive welfare whether or not they migrate. Their earnings and income outcomes do not change much
because of migration. 
Overall the results give new insight to welfare migration.  If one accounts for the possibility that
migration provides single mothers with a fresh start then one finds that single mothers improve earnings19
by moving. The welfare magnet literature might be overstating the importance of benefit levels as an
impetus for migration. 17 The yit-1 - "i - *!Xit-1 in f(•) represent ,it-1. In cases where yit-1 is censored, I use   
























if Mit'1 and  yit is censored,
Appendix A
The EC-algorithm estimation works in the following manner.  Let Qit be the vector of observable
variables for individual i in period t.  Let Ti be the number of times individual i is observed.  Let f($) be
the likelihood function.  For this paper f($) =
where N($) is the standard normal probability distribution function and M($) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function.
17  Let T = {k; *, D, "1, ...,"k, F1,...,Fk} be the set of parameters to be
estimated.  This set of parameters includes the number of classifications k.  Let Th = {*, D, "h, Fh}.  For













likelihoods lfi(T) over individuals i 0 {1,..., n}.  Call the outcome lf(T).  The estimate of T is ￿, the value
that maximizes lf(￿)-penalty(n,k!).  The estimate of k is k!.  Increasing  k! will always cause the log-
likelihood to increase.  Including the penalty function allows one to maximize over the possible set of
k’s.
I use the same penalty function as El-Gamal and Grether (1997).  They choose their penalty
functions on the basis of prior beliefs.  In particular the penalty function is based on the prior belief that
the probability the true k = k! is (0.5)
 k!.  Furthermore, they assume that all distributions of individuals
within the k! groups are equally likely.  This implies a penalty function, penalty(n,k!) = k!log(2) +nlog(k!)
- log(k!!).  
As mentioned before, the EC-algorithm provides an approximation to the results that would be
acquired by the EM-algorithm.  The problem with the EC-estimator is that it can misclassify individuals. 
These misclassifications could cause small sample biases.  To measure the degree of this problem El-
Gamal and Grether describe a summary statistic, the Average Normalized Entropy (ANE).  
The pij terms are estimates of the posterior belief that individual i belongs to type j.  If these probabilities
are all close to zero or one then the ANE is close to zero and there are few misclassifications. A high
ANE implies that one should estimate the parameters via the EM- algorithm.
The calculation of the pij  terms are based on the EM-algorithm.  The EM-algorithm consists of
an M-step procedure which estimates the parameter set {k; *, D, "1, ...,"k, F1,...,Fk}, and an E-step which
estimates the probability each individual belongs to each classification.  These probabilities are based on
the estimates obtained from the M-step.  The M-step is then repeated with the new probability estimates. 
To calculate the ANE, the M-step is passed by in each iteration.  Instead of using new estimates for each22




Age Age of the respondent.
Children Number of respondent’s own children living in the
household.
Education Number of years the respondent has spent in school.
Ever Move Indicator of whether the respondent has ever moved across
county lines since becoming a single mother. (People who
move across county lines, but are moving within the same
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), are not
considered movers.) 
Move Indicator of whether the respondent’s county of residence
changed since the previous interview.  (People who move
across county lines, but are moving within the same
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), are not
considered movers.) 
Years Since First Move Number of years since the respondent’s first move after
becoming a single mother. For males it is the number of
years since the respondent’s first move since 1979. The
variable takes on the value 0 for those respondents who
have never moved.  
Unemployment Unemployment rate in the respondent’s current state of
residence.
State Benefit Level Maximum monthly AFDC payment to a family of two in
the respondent’s state of residence, measured in 1992
dollars.
Maximum Benefit Level Maximum monthly AFDC payment adjusted for family
size, measured in 1992 dollars.
AFDC Participant Indicator of whether the respondent received AFDC benefits
during the month of the interview.24
Table 1 continued
Variable Definitions
Earnings Earnings the respondent received during the month of the
interview, measured in 1992 dollars.
Income Maximum of the  Maximum Benefit Level and the
Earnings variables.  This variable is considered to be a
measure of income.  Respondents can work and receive a
wage, but if their earnings are low they can be
supplemented by AFDC.
AFQT The individual’s age adjusted AFQT score.  The number
can be interpreted as standard deviations above or below the
mean.  The mean and standard deviation are male and single
mother specific.
South Indicator of whether the respondent lives in the South.









Age 24.86 3.43 24.17 3.14
Children 1.74 0.95 1.42 0.91
Education 11.83 1.82 11.16 1.87
Ever Move 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50
Move 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.30
Years Since First Move 3.60 4.75 2.98 3.73
Unemployment 7.19 2.19 6.88 2.27
State Benefit Level 332.78 159.17 451.11 160.84
ln(State Benefit Level) 5.69 0.49 6.03 0.42
Maximum Benefit Level 386.71 195.84 496.23 217.65
ln(Maximum Benefit Level) 5.83 0.51 6.11 0.45
AFDC Participant 0.56 0.50 0.49 0.50
Earnings 548.83 709.83 582.06 688.08
ln(Earnings) 6.82 0.67 6.68 0.81
Income 767.67 576.77 848.63 525.73
ln(Income) 6.28 0.73 6.47 0.60
AFQT -0.13 0.72 0.56 0.90
South 0.54 0.50 0.19 0.39
# individuals                                 613 216
# obs 3427 786
Note: The single mother subsample has been broken up into black and white subsamples and
consists of mothers in the NLSY who have never been married. Although  I observe most of
these women more times than are included in this Table, I have omitted the observations where
the respondent had no children, or where the respondent had been married at some point in the
past.   Also, there are 36 observations among the black single mothers where Years Since First
Move are unobserved. Among the black single mothers, there are 1,716 observations of
Earnings = 0.  Among the white single mothers, there are 333 observations of Earnings = 0.26
Table 3
Comparison of Movers to Stayers Before Move
BLACKS STAYERS MOVERS
Variable          Mean     Std. Dev.         Mean Std. Dev.
Age 23.88 3.44 23.46 3.20
Children 1.59 0.93 1.54 1.03
Education 11.74 1.79 12.18 1.82
Earnings 458.93 679.67 329.20 556.42
ln(Earnings) 6.81 0.69 6.52 0.93
Income 701.38 554.23 588.92 450.72
ln(Income) 6.29 0.73 6.12 0.72
AFDC Participant 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50
State Benefit Level 331.22 162.65 331.19 168.51
ln(State Benefit Level) 5.68 0.51 5.67 0.51
Maximum Benefit Level 369.83 209.37 362.10 221.52
ln(Maximum Benefit Level) 5.59 1.24 5.49 1.43
AFQT -0.14 0.71 0.12 0.86
South 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.49
Unemployment 7.28 2.30 7.39 2.22
 # obs 3299 128
WHITES  STAYERS MOVERS
Age 23.16 3.19 23.27 2.58
Children 1.26 0.97 1.14 0.51
Education 11.09 1.83 11.11 2.11
Earnings 467.35 653.85 561.14 593.32
ln(Earnings)  6.62 0.85 6.81 0.64
Income 769.45 508.66 794.67 405.64
ln(Income) 6.47 0.61 6.54 0.54
AFDC Participant 0.44 0.50 0.37 0.49
State Benefit Level 452.80 161.69 420.34 164.37
ln(State Benefit Level)  6.03 0.43 5.95 0.44
Maximum Benefit Level 451.96 268.93 423.88 200.41
ln(Maximum Benefit Level) 5.51 1.89 5.71 1.39
AFQT 0.53 0.88 0.77 1.01
South 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.44
Unemployment 6.98 2.31 7.08 2.46
 # obs 707 79
Note: There are 1,912 observations where the wages for black single mother stayers equals zero.  There are 82
observations where the wages for black single mother movers equals zero.  There are 369 observations where the
wages for white single mother stayers equals zero. There are 36 observations where the wages for white single
mother movers equals zero.27
Table 4




 Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 5.61* 4.49* 3.90* 4.44*
(0.40) (0.28) (0.39) (0.19)
Ever Move -0.13* -0.10* -0.40* -0.21*
(0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
Years Since First Move 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005)
Children -0.10* 0.03* -0.06 0.05*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Age 0.03* 0.05* 0.05* 0.04*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
Education 0.07* 0.08* 0.16* 0.10*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
AFQT 0.13* 0.18* --- ---
(0.04) (0.03) --- ---
South 0.04 -0.27* 0.08 -0.56*
(0.05) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07)
Unemployment -0.04* -0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White -0.17* 0.05 --- ---
(0.06) (0.05) --- ---
# individuals 603 822 603 822
# obs 2145 4177 2145 4177
Note: Time dummies were included in the estimated equations.  Parameter estimates of the coefficients
of the time dummies are available upon request.  Observations where Earnings = 0 are omitted when
ln(Earnings) is the dependent varaible.  The 36 observations where Years Since First Move are missing
have also been omitted. * estimate is significant at a 5% level.  (standard errors in parentheses) 28
Table 5
Changes in AFDC Participation After Migration: Single Mother Subsample
Dependent Variable: AFDC Participant
Estimation Technique: Logit and Fixed-Effect Logit
Logit   F. E. Logit
Constant 4.09* ---
(0.63) ---
Ever Move 0.25 0.78
(0.14) (0.44)
















# obs 4177 1667
Note: Time dummies were included in the estimated equations.  Parameter estimates of the coefficients
of the time dummies are available upon request.   * estimate is significant at a 5% level.  (standard errors
in parentheses).29
Table 6
Changes in Earnings in the Years Prior to a Move
Dependent Variables:  
(1) ln(1 Year Ago Earnings)
(2)ln(2 Year Ago Earnings)
Random Effects Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 5.06** 5.20** 4.19** 4.98**
(0.42) (0.45) (0.46) (0.53)
Move -0.12* 0.06 -0.13* 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Children -0.11** -0.07** -0.07* 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age 0.05** 0.04** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.07** 0.06** 0.13** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
AFQT 0.10** 0.14** --- ---
(0.04) (0.04) --- ---
South 0.11** 0.14** 0.09 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.17)
Unemployment -0.04** -0.02 -0.04** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
White -0.12 -0.10 --- ---
(0.07) (0.08) --- ---
# individuals 554 503 554 503
# obs 1814 1570 1814 1570
Note: Time dummies were included in the estimated equations.  Parameter estimates of the coefficients
of the time dummies are available upon request.  Observations are omitted when the dependent
variable equals -4.  ** estimate is significant at a 5% level.  * estimate is significant at a 10% level.
(standard errors in parentheses)30
Table 7
Earnings Equation Estimates


















Type 1 Constant (" "1) 5.4364*
(0.25)
Type 2 Constant (" "2) 3.1166*
(0.26)
Type 1 Standard Error (F F1) 0.4523*
(0.01)
Type 2 Standard Error (F F2) 1.2505*
(0.06)
Cov(, ,t,, ,t-1) if Mt = 0 (D D) 0.4445*
(0.01)






Note: Time dummies were included in the estimated equations.  Parameter estimates of the coefficients
of the time dummies are available upon request.  49% of the 829 single mothers are Type 1's.  * estimate
is significant at a 5% level.  (standard errors in parentheses).31
Table 8
Estimated Effects of Migration 
Single Mother Subsample
Lagged , Ln(Benefits) Ln(Benefits) The Effect of Migration on
of Old State of New State Earnings Benefit Receipt Income
-0.20 5.75 5.75 0.035 0.004 0.036
-0.20 5.75 6.00 0.035 0.067 0.052
-0.20 5.75 6.25 0.035 0.186 0.090
-0.20 6.00 6.00 0.035 0.003 0.037
-0.20 6.00 6.25 0.035 0.123 0.075
-0.20 6.25 6.25 0.035 -0.005 0.037
0.00 5.75 5.75 0.000 0.008 0.002
0.00 5.75 6.00 0.000 0.060 0.014
0.00 5.75 6.25 0.000 0.166 0.046
0.00 6.00 6.00 0.000 0.014 0.005
0.00 6.00 6.25 0.000 0.121 0.037
0.00 6.25 6.25 0.000 0.017 0.009
0.20 5.75 5.75 -0.035 0.009 -0.033
0.20 5.75 6.00 -0.035 0.052 -0.023
0.20 5.75 6.25 -0.035 0.146 0.004
0.20 6.00 6.00 -0.035 0.021 -0.029
0.20 6.00 6.25 -0.035 0.114 -0.003
0.20 6.25 6.25 -0.035 0.034 -0.022
Note: The effect of migration is being calculated for a Type 1, 22 year-old black single mother with one
child and eleven years of education  in a state with a seven percent unemployment rate not located in the
south. 32
Table 9
Predictions of Who Improves Outcomes by Migrating
Movers Stayers












   Earnings 101 0.76 0.10 1860 0.63 0.05
   Income 101 0.77 0.10 1860 0.64 0.05
   Reduction 
   in Benefit 
   Receipt
101 0.47 0.00 1860 0.39 0.01
   Increase in Benefit 
   Levels Conditional 




   Earnings 106 0.71 -0.01 2146 0.88 0.01
   Income 106 0.65 0.07 2146 0.88 0.02
   Reduction 
   in Benefit
   Receipt
106 0.68 0.00 2146 0.88 0.01
  Increase in Benefit  
  Levels Conditional 
  on New State
49 0.51 0.11
This table is read in the following manner: of the 101 Type 1 single mothers who moved, the model
predicts that 76 percent increase their earnings by moving.  Among the 101 single mother movers the
average change in earnings is a 10 percent increase.  If the 1860 Type 1 single mothers who stayed
moved within their home state, the model predicts 63 percent would increase their earnings.  The average
change in earnings would be 5 percent.33
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